Homomorphic encryption is widely used in the scenarios of big data and cloud computing for supporting calculations on ciphertexts without leaking plaintexts. Recently, Li et al. designed a symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme for outsourced databases. Wang et al. proposed a successful key-recovery attack on the homomorphic encryption scheme but required the adversary to know some plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In this paper, we propose a new ciphertext-only attack on the symmetric fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Our attack improves the previous Wang et al. 's attack by eliminating the assumption of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We show that the secret key of the user can be recovered by running lattice reduction algorithms twice. Experiments show that the attack successfully and efficiently recovers the secret key of the randomly generated instances with an overwhelming probability.
Introduction
With the rapid development of big data, the significance of privacy and security issues was highly regarded. A series of cryptoghraphic applications, such as fair electronic transaction [1] , outsourcing data classification [2] , lightweight security system of Internet of Things [3] , mobile Ecommerce [4] , and data mining based on homomorphic encryption, have been proposed.
Homomorphic encryption schemes allow users to meaningfully calculate ciphertexts without knowing the underlying plaintexts. For example, the RSA cryptosystem [5] (Pallier cryptosystem [6] , respectively) only supports homomorphic multiplications (additions, respectively) on ciphertexts. In 2009, Gentry [7] designed the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with ideal lattices. Thereafter, significant efforts had been performed to improve the efficiency of homomorphic encryption schemes [8] [9] [10] . However, all the known fully homomorphic encryptions are criticized for the high ciphertext expansion and ciphertext refreshing costs and hence cannot be directly used in practice. So researchers designed some cryptographic schemes with homomorphic properties dedicated to some concrete computing scenarios [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Recently, Li et al. [16] designed a symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme for outsourced databases that allow multiple data owners to efficiently share their data securely without compromising the privacy of the data. However, Wang et al. [17] observed that if some plaintext/ciphertext pairs were succesfully overdropped, one can efficiently recover the corresponding secret key of the scheme from the obtained plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
In practical scenarios, it may be difficult for the adversary to capture plaintext/ciphertext pairs. In this paper, we propose a new efficient cryptanalytic attack on Li et al. 's homomorphic encryption scheme. The attack consists of two stages. In the first stage, we separate the parts of the ciphertexts, which contain no secret key . In the second stage, we separate the parts of the ciphertexts, which contain neither secret key nor . Thus and can be calculated during an acceptable time. The whole attack needs only several ciphertexts without corresponding plaintexts. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review Li et al. 's symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme and introduce the concept of lattice. In Section 3, we propose our attack and give the experimental results. In Section 4, we conclude our work.
Preliminaries
2.1. Notations. In this paper, the symbol Z is used to denote the ring of integer. Matrices are represented with bold uppercase characters like B, while vectors are represented with bold lower-case characters like k. All of the vectors in this paper are represented as row vectors. The symbol ‖k‖ means the length of vector k under the Euclidean norm, while the symbol | | 2 means the bit length of integer .
The symbol ≪ means "much less than", i.e. if ≪ , the ratio / is a negligible function ( ) of the security parameter . In mathematics, a negligible function ( ) means that for any polynomial function ( ), there exists an integer such that for any > ,
2.2. Symmetric Homomorphic Encryption. The symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Li et al. comprises these three algorithms as follows:
Input a security parameter , this algorithm outputs a secret key = ( , ) and a public parameter , where ≪ .
(ii) Encryption algorithm () = ( , , ) = ( + ) (mod ) .
(
Input a secret key , a plaintext ∈ and a parameter , this algorithm outputs a ciphertext = ( , , ). Notice that the parameter should satisfy | | 2 + | | 2 < | | 2 .
(iii) Decryption algorithm () = ( , , ) = ( × − (mod )) (mod ) . (4) Input a secret key , a ciphertext ∈ and the ciphertext's degree , this algorithm outputs a ciphertext ← ( , , ). The proof of the correctness is simple:
( , , ) = ( × − (mod )) (mod ) = (( ( + ) (mod )) × − (mod )) (mod ) = ( + ) (mod ) = .
(5)
Notice that the correctness of ( + ) (mod ) = requires ≪ and | | 2 + | | 2 < | | 2 .
The symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Li et al. supports homomorphic addition and multiplication and is used to construct their secure outsourced comparison scheme and privacy-preserving mining solutions. Though our attack needs no homomorphic properties, we still list a brief proof, for the reason that it implies the setting of parameters.
(i) Homomorphic addition: For the ciphertext 1 , 2 of two plaintexts 1 , 2 , we have
The correct decryption of 1 + 2 requires 1 = 2 and
(ii) Homomorphic multiplication: For the ciphertext 1 , 2 of two plaintexts 1 , 2 , we have
The correct decryption of 1 × 2 requires ( 1 2 +
Lattice. An -dimension lattice L can be regarded as a set of all integer coefficient linear combinations of basis vectors {b
One of the most famous problems involving lattice is the shortest vector problem (SVP). Given a basis of a lattice, the goal is to find one non-zero vector, which has the shortest length ‖k‖. Some approximation algorithms are usually used for solving SVP as oracles, such as LLL and BKZ algorithms. The LLL algorithm is developed by A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr. and L. Lovasz [18] in 1982. Given a basis of a lattice, the LLL algorithm outputs a reduced basis, which has a smaller size by Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. It has various applications in cryptanalysis and other fields, such as integer programming and finding integer relations.
The Proposed Attack
3.1. Main Idea. Define + as , and −1 1 as . Our attack has two stages. In the first stage, we construct a lattice L(F)
Algorithm 1: The Attack Algorithm.
with 's and run the LLL algorithm to obtain a short vector, which contains 's. In the second stage, we construct a lattice L(A) with 's and run the LLL algorithm again to obtain a short vector which contains 's. It is obvious that the secret key ( , ) can be computed as = −1 mod and = / mod . Notice that there is no need for the plaintexts 's in the attack.
Details.
In this part, we give a specification of the attack in Algorithm 1. The input of the attack algorithm contains a set of ciphertexts = { 1 , . . . , } and the modular of the encryption scheme without plaintexts 's. The output of the attack algorithm contains and which can be used to decrypt ciphertexts.
In the first stage, the lattice L(F) is constructed as
Thus a short vector k ∈ L(F) could be expressed as
Through LLL's algorithm, we could obtain a short vector f ∈ L(F). Sketch of Proof. Suppose that 1 = + , then we have
Hence, values of 2 / , . . . , / are close to those of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 . Because | −1 − | is small, we can obtain that −1 / − / < ( ). Hence, values of 1 / , . . . , −1 / are close to those of 2 / , . . . , / . Since 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 and 1 / , . . . , −1 / are both close to 2 / , . . . , / , we obtain that values of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 are close to 1 / , . . . , −1 / . With a non-negligible probability, 1 , . . . , −1 equal 2 , . . . , , and is equal to 1 .
As
In the second stage, the lattice L(A) is constructed as
Thus a short vector w ∈ L(A) could be expressed as
Through LLL's algorithm, we could obtain a short vector a ∈ L(A). Sketch of Proof. Considering = + , we have / 1 = ( + )/( 1 + 1 ) ≈ ( )/( 1 ) = / 1 . Hence, values of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 are close to those of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 .
Because | −1 1 − | is small, we can obtain that
Hence, values of 1 / , . . . , −1 / are close to those of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 . Since 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 and 1 / , . . . , −1 / are both close to 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 , we obtain that values of 2 / 1 , . . . , / 1 are close to 1 / , . . . , −1 / . With a non-negligible probability, 1 , . . . , −1 equal 2 , . . . , , and is equal to 1 .
Likewise, we have 1 = |(a) | and +1 = (|(a) | + 1 * +1 )/ 1 , = 1, . . . , − 1.
Since we have recovered all the 's and 's, the secret key ( , ) could be simply computed as = −1 and = i / . Parameters 1 , 1 and 1 are used to compute ( , ) in the algorithm. 3.3. Experiments. We run our proposed cryptanalytic algorithm on a personal computer using NTL library [19] . The environment is listed as follows:
(i) CPU: Intel(R) Core (TM) i3-7100 3.90GHz (ii) RAM: 4.00GB (iii) OS: Windows 10 64bit
Notice that the output of the attack algorithm is . In [16] , the parameter is called ciphertext degree and is believed to be a small positive integer. It means that we could collect enough -degree ciphertexts we need, and it is not difficult to recover from . For the -degree ciphertexts, the encryption and decryption algorithms only require rather than . Thus, it is sufficient to break the scheme if we can recover . For convenience, we suppose the parameter = 1 in the encryption algorithm. When ̸ = 1, our algorithm still works correctly.
The results are given in Table 1 . As a result of the approximation, the chance of success is relavant to | | 2 , | | 2 , and | | 2 . The best situation is when | | 2 ≈ | | 2 and | | ≪ | |. To make it easier to understand our proposed attack, we give an example to illustrate the procedure of the algorithm in Table 2 . The parameters are set as | | 2 = 256, | | 2 = 64, | | 2 = 64, and ≤ /256.
Firstly, we compute all the 's with the input ciphertexts ( 1 , . . . , ). Secondly, we use LLL algorithm to obtain a short vector for solving all 's. Thirdly, we use LLL algorithm again to obtain a short vector for solving all 's. Finally, we compute secret key ( , ) with 's and 's.
In practice, the first row f (a, respectively) of the reduced basis of L(F) (L(A), respectively) which is a row vector with a short norm; thus we regard it as the short vector k (w, respectively) we need.
The chance of success depends on the bit lengths of , , and . In the first stage, | | ≪ | | requires | | ≪ | |. In the second stage, / 1 = ( + )/( 1 + 1 ) ≈ ( )/( 1 ) = / 1 requires | | ≪ | |. Thus we need to hold | | ≪ | | ≪ | |. Besides, the recovery of from also limit the setting of parameters. Notice that = + , where 0 ≤ < . If < , the result of / is equal to . However, when | | 2 < | | 2 , we cannot confirm that 0 ≤ < . In conclusion, the best situation is when | | ≈ | | and | | is slightly greater than | |.
Complexity Analysis.
We start with some simple conclusions about computational complexity.
(1) The computational complexity of modular inverse modulo is (log 3 ).
(2) The computational complexity of modular multiplication modulo is (log 2 ).
(3) The computational complexity of the LLL algorithm is ( 5 (log 2 )) [20] , where is the dimension of the lattice, and is the maximum length of input basis under the Euclidean norm.
Combining (1) and (2), we can conclude that the computational complexity of calculating 's, 's, , and is (log 3 ).
In our attack, = and ≤ √( − 1) 2 + 1. We can obtain the computational complexity of the LLL algorithm 
Because < , we can obtain log < log , thus ( 5 (log 2 )) = ( 5 log 2 ).
In practice, the computational complexity of our attack is mainly dependent on that of the LLL algorithm. For example, suppose that 5 log 2 ≤ log 3 we can obtain log ≥ 5 . If we set = 20, then log ≥ 20 5 ≈ 2 21 . It means that is a 2 21bit-length prime, while the bit length of the prime we usually use is 2048 = 2 11 or 4096 = 2 12 .
Above all, the computational complexity of our attack algorithm is ( 5 log 2 ). Obviously, it is worse than the complexity (log 4 ) of Wang et al. 's attack [17] ; however, our attack eliminates the assumption of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Discussions.
Notice that in the attack algorithm, the output of the LLL algorithm is a vector, such as f and a, rather than a reduced basis. We regard the first row vector of an LLLreduced basis as the goal short vector. We explain the reason below.
An -LLL-reduced B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b } has two important properties:
(1) ∀1 ≤ ≤ , < , | , | ≤ 1/2,
From these two properties, we can conclude that
where 1 (L) is the length of the shortest non-zero vector in L(B). Please refer to [21] for more detailed introduction and proof.
The efficiency of our attack algorithm is mainly subject to the parameter . Smaller implies a greater chance of success for the reason that 's and 's can be recovered from the LLL algorithm easier while the runtime of the LLL algorithm rises rapidly. In our experiment, we recommend that should be set as 20 considering both the chance of success and the runtime. In addition, the chance of success is also limited by sizes of , , and . Table 3 gives a comparision of Wang et al's attack and ours. Although the bit lengths of the parameters | | 2 , | | 2 and | | 2 are close but different, the average time of Wang et al's is much less than ours. However, the improved attack algorithm eliminates the assumption of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, thus a ciphertext-only adversary can break the encryption scheme through this way.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new attack algorithm on the symmetric homomorphic encryption scheme presented by Li et al. Our attack can recover the secret key pair from several ciphertexts without plaintexts. In our experiment, the attack an be finished during an acceptable period of time with recovering most of the secret key in the generated instances. For the cases | | 2 = 256, | | 2 = | | 2 = 64, ≤ /256, the key-recovery cryptanalytic algorithm only takes about 29 seconds. Although the running time and the opportunity of success depend on the sizes of parameters, the attack algorithm can still be used in real practice to recover secret key pairs.
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